Politicization and political contests in and around contemporary multinational corporations: An introduction by Clegg, S et al.
Politicization and political contests in and around contemporary multinational 
corporations: An introduction 
Stewart Clegg, Mike Geppert and Graham Hollinshead  
 
Abstract 
This article looks at core arguments in International Business, Organization Studies and 
surrounding academic fields that focus on the study of politicization and political contests in 
and around multinational corporations (MNCs). Two evident streams of debate are identified. 
Equally evident is that these streams hardly connect. One stream is mainly interested in 
studying politicization from the outside while the other is mainly interested in politicization 
from within. As a way of connecting both streams, we introduce the circuits of power 
framework. Next we introduce the contributions of our Special Issue, followed by concluding 
comments which distinguishes five emergent themes. First, we show how the application of 
the circuits of power framework sheds new light on the study of political contests of MNCs. 
Second, we highlight that the role of nation states has not lost its significance as, for example, 
political CSR approaches would have us believe. Third, dominant ideologies play an 
important role in establishing and controlling circuits of power in and around MNCs. Fourth, 
it is vital to take labour issues into account in this field of study. Fifth, there is increasing 
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In positioning this Special Issue, it is not possible to proceed as if it is ‘business as 
normal’ in the global economy. The recent shock waves to structural and normative orders 
bring to the fore, perhaps more unequivocally than ever before, the realization that the 
context for the existence of international organization and conduct of international business 
can scarcely be conceived in rational and orderly terms. The backcloth for scholarly 
deliberations in this field is characterized by its inherent politicized complexity and the 
fragmentation of social and political orders according to dispersed vested interests that are 
frequently opaque.  
Given the evident turbulence in the context for the field that forms the focal point for 
this special issue, it is indeed curious that mainstream International Business (IB) studies 
hardly consider issues of politicization and political contents when studying the internal and 
external affairs of multinational corporations (MNCs) (Geppert and Dörrenbächer, 2014). 
What is more, in institutional theory, in the ‘biggest church’ in contemporary organization 
studies (OS) that is the most influential stream for the study of MNCs, notions of power and 
politicization have been subjects of serious neglect, suggesting a positively conservative 
stance when it comes to such issues (Munir, 2015; Geppert, 2015). As Clegg (2010) argues, 
the legacy of much institutional theory has been an overriding emphasis on shared meanings, 
institutional processes and institutional conformity. What is lacking is a full recognition of 
the significance of struggle and conflict, which also, significantly, calls into account the role 
of the state. Arguably at a time of institutional volatility at various levels of institutional and 
organizational analysis, it is becoming even more pressing to inject notions of contestation 
and politicization into salient scholarly discourse. The point of departure for this Special 
Issue, therefore, is to acknowledge that the terrain for multinational organization is one that is 
 
inevitably subject to crisis, change and contestation and to explore various contemporary 
manifestations of politicized developments in and around the MNC. 
At the outset, it is worth bringing to the fore our assumptions concerning 
contemporary MNCs which served to frame the contributions to this Special Issue. 
First, that existing lines of enquiry into MNCs and International Business need to be 
broadened to encompass the dominant external social and economic relations that contribute 
to the formation of normative and structural orders framing the institutional field of 
international corporations. Accordingly, it is necessary to embrace in discussion not only the 
identities and ideologies of actors constituting the primary stakeholders within MNCs but 
also those agencies notionally outside their organizational boundaries yet who are necessarily 
implicated it its policy formulations and affairs.  
Second, our view of the nature of power within the MNC is that it is primarily 
relational in character, manifested as a product of continuously socially constructed 
relationships between key actors and flowing through different circuits (Clegg, 1989; Clegg 
et al., 2006). Such an approach departs from previous contributions in the field that have 
tended to regard power as static and reified, ‘stored up’ in external institutional or internal 
organizational structures. From such a point of view interrelationships within and around 
MNCs need to be seen as ‘contested terrains’ which can be more or less politicized (Edwards 
and Bélanger, 2009). 
Third, we would concur with novel social-political trajectories which pay attention to 
the interests, ideologies, identities and careers of key actors represented within the social 
fabric of the MNCs power relations as well as of those outside its formal boundaries (Geppert 
and Dörrenbächer, 2014). Recent theoretical developments in the study of MNCs (Morgan 
and Kristensen, 2006; Becker-Ritterspach et al., 2016) refer to the micro-political 
 
determinants of their social construction and depict MNC organization as essentially 
comprising a conjuncture of potentially conflictual ‘social spaces’. 
Following from these three points we emphasize the ‘asymmetric’ (Clark and 
Geppert, 2006) and ‘hegemonic’ (Levy, 2008) nature of international hierarchy. MNC 
headquarters are typically embedded in the nerve centres of the global economy. Their 
employees at head office are imbued with the qualities of cosmopolitanism, extra territoriality 
and financialized orientation, members of a global elite rather than being deeply rooted in 
local communities. By contrast, subsidiaries are prone to be populated by more localized and 
territorially constrained members of the global working population, particularly in emerging 
and developing economies.  
As this Special Issue will demonstrate, even if the nature of multinational organization 
is tending to shift from solid to more liquid forms, from constrained and enveloped 
bureaucratic relations to open network relations, the architectonics and dynamics of power 
remain predominantly intact. There is a clear hierarchical disposition of regional spaces and 
organization nodes, albeit one that is fluid, as new regions of the global economy become 
incorporated and subsumed. In accord with Levy (2008) we would argue that the Global 
Production Networks (GPNs) that have proliferated in the era of transnational development 
are legitimized through neo-liberal discourses. Not only what is consumed but also the ways 
in which these goods and services are produced increasingly become subject to a global 
rational instrumentalism. Labour is disciplined and managed according to the fundamentals 
of ‘scientific’ management of the labour process wherever the GPNs occur. Frequently the 
rationale underlying the organization of GPNs may be perceived as contradictory and 
ambiguous, overtly exploitative orientations perhaps co-existing with espoused concerns for 
the environment, sustainability and the like. However, on close scrutiny, it becomes evident 
that the agenda underlying the inception and operation of GPNs invariably concerns the use 
 
of labour in a highly instrumental fashion, with an overriding emphasis being placed on 
‘performativity’. 
In a rapidly shifting global order, and within newly emerging ‘transnational social 
spaces’ (Morgan, 2001), power relations are being constructed through the interplay of 
various transnational actors, elites, devices, discourses and languages. Urgent consideration 
of the role of key actors is required in terms of their conflicting perceptions, intra- and inter-
organizational political contests and approaches to sensemaking, the powerful boundaries that 
they construct to constrain social and economic relations, manage resistances to change, 
channel the powers of knowledge flows and deploy dominant ideologies. 
 
Politicization and political contests in and around MNCs 
In the next two sub-sections we will discuss the following questions: What does 
politicization mean in the context of contemporary MNCs? Why and how does it matter? 
What is the focus of key conceptual approaches dealing with the politicization and political 
contests in and around MNCs? In what ways does applying the circuits of power framework 
help to demonstrate how internal and external political contests and politicization within the 
transnational social space of the MNC are intertwined?  
 
Politicization of multinationals in mainstream international business studies: Neglect and 
lack of consideration based on flawed theories 
The politicization of MNCs in the IB literature is usually seen as a result of increased 
globalization of management, organization and employment since the 1960s. The opening 
salvo was Servan-Schreiber’s (2014) Le défi américain, which was a profoundly French 
response to the challenge posed by American multinationals. The book argued that the United 
States and Europe were engaged in an economic war of management techniques, 
 
technological tools and research capacity that America was winning hands down. The book 
was instrumental in creating a resurgence of French nationalism and drew attention to the 
importance of US multinational penetration of France and other European economies. The 
penetration quickened pace: for instance, it was only in 1974 that McDonald’s initiated its 
European operations in Woolwich, East London. McDonald’s openings are good index of US 
globalizations’ increasing spread1: in 1990 the first McDonald’s opened in the People’s 
Republic of China in Shenzhen. As MNCs that largely originated from the US started to enter 
into developed and then, latterly, increasingly into developing countries, local political 
concerns were apparent. 
The growing significance and role of MNCs in ‘world politics’ began to be observed 
with some consternation by prominent onlookers from the1960s onwards. Emerging political 
actors began to perceive MNCs as representing ‘an important threat’ for national 
governments and their companies (Nye, 1974). Politicization was presented as a challenge to 
the established ‘rules of the game’ within formerly protected national market economies and 
by associated key players, including local companies and other important national-level 
stakeholders, especially the government. A key area of controversy concerning the 
emergence of MNCs as political actors was seen in the increased ‘managerial autonomy’ of 
these new powerful players coupled with apparent lack of democratic forms of control (Nye, 
1974) both nationally and, perhaps more significantly for our purposes, transnationally. 
While these concerns animated Foreign Investment Review Boards in some countries the 
political role and social responsibility of increasingly internationally operating firms did not 
become a staple concern of mainstream IB although, as we will see below, they became a 
central part of debates rehearsed by scholars of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in 
later years. Instead Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and the role of MNCs have been largely 
analysed in apolitical terms, based on strong free-market ideology. From such a perspective, 
 
the beneficial economic role of MNCs and FDI for both the host countries and home country 
of MNCs has been one-sidedly over-emphasized. The negative effects of FDI and the ‘dark 
side of MNCs’ (Cairns and As-Saber, 2017) have either been neglected altogether or 
downplayed, especially in studies informed by agency theory and transaction cost 
economics.2 One of the most prominent international business scholars, Sumantra Ghoshal 
(2005), self-critically pointed to the toxic effects of this ‘gloomy’ ideology-driven research 
that glorifies the management of MNCs: “Combine agency theory with transaction cost 
economics, add in standard versions of game theory and negotiation analysis, and the picture 
of the manager that emerges is one that is now very familiar in practice: the ruthlessly hard-
driving, strictly top-down, command-and-control focused, shareholder-value-obsessed, win-
at-any-cost business leader…” (Sumantra Ghoshal, 2005: 85). 
As Edwards (2017) contends, while mainstream scholars may have accepted that 
MNCs are inherently pluralistic concerns, such recognition has tended to remain ‘nascent’. In 
an analysis which offers critique of relatively static conceptions of power in mainstream 
international business studies, Ferner et al. (2012), drawing upon the contribution of Lukes 
(2005), suggest that different types of power capability exist whereby MNCs may actively 
influence their institutional environments both at the level of host institutional arrangements 
and within the MNC itself. This assertion is reinforced by Edwards (2017) who asserts that 
much analysis of power has rested upon notions of resource dependency, thus tending to 
neglect the salience of Lukes’ ‘third’ dimension of power that implies that power can be used 
to assert influence in a way that actors at various levels of MNC power relations may not be 
aware of the critical resources available to them. In short, the problems of increased FDI, the 
powerful impact of MNCs on national and transnational institution-building and the negative 
effects of deregulation and financialization for the wider society and natural environment 
have rarely been addressed in mainstream international business (Geppert et al., 2006). 
 
Indeed the political role of MNCs and their managements has been reduced to narrow and 
functionally based economic criteria such as shareholder value, return on investment (ROI) 
and rent seeking.  
Critical international business scholars have recently contended that ‘classical’ 
international business discourse is tantamount to being ‘dead’ and have questioned whether a 
‘rebirth’ is possible given that the field is heavily locked into narrow theory-building and-
testing, based on well-established positivist analytical models (Delios, 2017). A way forward 
from this intellectual cul de sac is proposed in the engagement of IB scholars in more 
context-specific and qualitative oriented studies. In order to pursue this course, however, 
‘deep learning’ from other social science disciplines such as sociology and geography is seen 
as crucial (Delios, 2017). Let us now consider the alternative wider social science based 
disciplinary approaches that are available for the study of the politicization in and around the 
MNC.   
 
Politicization of multinationals in the wider social sciences: Analytical divides 
There are two approaches which prominently address the external politicization of 
MNCs: a) political CSR and b) social movement and international relations based studies.  
Political CSR can be regarded as a direct response to the shortcomings of economic theories 
that frame MNCs as rational economic actors that predominantly follow the logics of share-
holder value and/or profit-maximization (see e.g. Moon et al., 2005; Scherer and Palazzo, 
2011; Höllerer et al., 2017). It is assumed that national modes of governmental control and 
corporate governance in globally liberalized market economies have become outdated and 
dysfunctional in their application. It is argued further that in a globalized world, MNCs have 
become transcendent political actors that supersede the regulative ambit of individual nation 
states. Transnational forms of governance and control are therefore required to deal with 
 
unethical behaviour by MNCs that harm not only the interests of the state and its citizens but 
also the wider transnational community. It is stressed that MNCs are powerful political 
actors, often more powerful than nation states. They might be tamed, however, when they are 
engaging in multi-stakeholder negotiations with governmental and non-governmental actors 
in formulating transnational ‘rules of the game’.   
Scherer and Palazzo (2011) argue that MNCs are politicized in two ways: first 
because they operate with an ‘enlarged understanding of responsibility’ when they actively 
develop political solutions together with other with state and non-state (civil society) actors, 
and second because they become ‘subjects of new forms of democratic control and 
legitimacy’ when engaged in these self-regulated political processes (Scherer and Palazzo, 
2011). They anticipate that negotiated transnational agreements and international codes of 
conduct may render MNCs amenable to overarching principles of social and economic 
responsibility.  
 
Social movements and international relations scholars expand some of the key ideas 
of political CSR further by stressing the central role of the interaction between MNCs and 
non-governmental actors, such as political activist groups, in the process of transnational 
institution-building (see e.g. Den Hond and De Bakker, 2012; Zajak, 2017).  Accordingly, it 
is believed that ‘politicization from the outside’ occurs because “MNCs become confronted 
with demands for regulation, participate in controversial public discourse, and engage in 
political contestation with other non-state actors across a diverse range of institutional 
settings” (Zajak, 2017: 390). This research trajectory has focused particularly upon the 
structuring and discursive construction of political contests and politicization in different 
institutional fields (De Bakker et al., 2013) and industries (Zajak, 2017). In contrast to 
political CSR research, which mainly concerns the various political roles that MNCs and 
 
other powerful stakeholders can play in transnational institution building, it is the 
politicization process itself that constitutes the focus of analysis here. A key finding of 
Zajak’s research (2017) is that merely considering how powerful MNCs are, or the 
extensiveness of their power resources in comparison to other stakeholders, is rather short 
sighted.  Instead, the impact of the wider context of the industry and the ideological stances 
of collective actors when interacting with the MNC are seen as central aspects in the study of 
politicization. Accordingly, the structuration of the industry is a significant determinant of its 
level of politicization. Significant factors in this respect are likely to be whether the industry 
is highly fragmented (such as the global toy industry), or whether it is dominated by highly 
visible, brand owning, corporations, such as in the sporting goods industry. It has been found 
that MNCs operating in industries with highly visible and brand-owning characteristics are 
more prone to become and remain politicized. Finally, the act of setting up transnational 
regulatory institutions is seen to trigger the de-politicization of an industry (Zajak, 2017).  
The research on both approaches that stress ‘politicization from the outside’ is open to 
criticism. The normative assumptions of political CSR have been criticised because of the 
neglect of the structural power asymmetries between key stakeholders, notably management 
and labour, within the hierarchy of the MNC and its global supply chain (see e.g. Banerjee, in 
this issue). Moreover, the neglect by the social movement and international relations 
approaches of the impact of internal political processes and discursive practices on the 
concrete interactions between MNC management and external stakeholders, for example 
political activist movements, is problematic. So far, then we have just explored one part of 
the story.  This leads us to the next two approaches that deal with the other element of our 
exposition, the role of internal power relations and political processes in the MNC. 
There are two prominent approaches that focus strongly on internal politicization processes: 
a) micro-political and b) discursive studies of the MNC. 
 
Micro-political contributions are anchored in comparative institutionalist research, 
which stresses the importance of contextual rationalities that are influenced by the societal 
institutional diversity of the MNC in question. Such institutional diversity is seen as 
important in the structuring and political constitution of the MNC. However, actor-centred 
institutionalists also stress that key actors, mainly based in the headquarters and subsidiaries’ 
top management teams, act strategically and often politically. Their interaction with other 
internal and external powerful actors is seen as responsible for politicization and de-
politicization of MNCs from the inside. It is highlighted that key actors’ coalition-building 
efforts with powerful stakeholders within the societal context in which the firm operates, are 
driven by motives, interests and goals that are not necessarily congruent with the overall 
goals and strategy of the MNC (see also Becker-Ritterspach et al., 2016 for an overview). In 
short, MNCs are conceived as ‘contested terrains’ (Edwards and Bélanger, 2009), affording 
arenas in which micro-political game playing related to issues such as budgeting, subsidiary 
mandate allocation and change episodes occurs (Geppert and Dörrenbächer, 2014).  
Politicization processes are regarded as being influenced by the robustness and/or 
weakness of ‘tool kits’, which actors try to build when becoming engaged in game-playing 
(Williams and Geppert, 2011). The power resources for building ‘robust tools’ are linked 
with country-specific societal institutions, e.g. local labour law and industrial relations 
systems. These can offer variable support of local subsidiary actors in influencing HQ 
imposed measures, such as outsourcing and coercive benchmarking (Morgan and Kristensen, 
2006). The critical observation has been mooted, however, that systemic aspects of MNC 
power relations and macro-political structures are not fully acknowledged in these studies 
(e.g. Morgan, 2011) 
Discursive approaches are rooted, theoretically, in postmodernist and poststructuralist 
studies. It is believed that discursive political struggles and language games are the medium 
 
for, and outcome of, internal politicization processes (see e.g. Vaara and Tienari, 2008, for an 
overview). The analysis of internal communication processes, corporate language, language 
skills, language policies and linguistic artefacts are central topics (van Marrewijk, Ybema, 
Smits, Clegg and Pitsis, 2016). In contrast to micro-political approaches that focus on 
individual actors’ strategizing approaches in internal politicization processes, what is central 
to these discursive approaches are phenomena such as political sensemaking between the HQ 
and the subsidiaries (Clark and Geppert, 2011) as well as the hegemonic influence of societal 
discourses such as financialization on internal discursive struggles. A strong focus of this 
stream has been on the internal politicization of MNCs in the context of mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As). Politicization is related to ‘confusion’ and ‘ambiguity’, which often 
emerge in cases of mergers and acquisitions post-acquisition integration processes (Vaara, 
2003: 887). Other research has concentrated on the role of subjective national identity and 
transnational constructions, and how stereotyping of headquarters and subsidiary managers 
for politicization episodes has occurred, as well as systematic aspects of internal 
politicization in MNCs (Koveshnikov, 2016; Vaara et al., 2005). Discursive studies, however, 
neglect paying close attention to individual key actors’ interests and motives in political 
strategizing processes, interests and motives that drive and underline internal politicization 
processes. 
So far debates about the politicization of MNCs and politics within MNCs have 
hardly been interrelated, an issue highlighted by Morgan (2011). He calls for the linking of 
micro- and macro-politics for the study of the contemporary MNC and suggests envisaging 
the MNC as a ‘transnational social space, a contested terrain in which the shape of the terrain 
must be itself be analysed in order to understand how micro-political space are pre-
structured’ (Morgan, 2011: 433), an issue we take up in this lead article.   
 
The contributions to our Special Issue demonstrate that there are new ways in which 
politicization of MNCs, and within MNCs, can be studied and conceptualized. They show 
that an in-depth analysis of social, industrial and societal contexts is required in order to 
understand better how internal and external processes of politicization are intertwined. When 
doing this, we actually recognize glimpses of actor, organization, national and transnational 
specific features in the five papers collected in the Special Issue that cast light upon the more 
or less politicized transnational social spaces of the MNC.  
First, the political dynamic of the ongoing exchange between firm-specific and 
transnational capital is explored, which has salience when MNCs decide to transform their 
traditionally hierarchical modes of organizing into network-forms (Reiche et al., in this 
issue). Second, research points to the impact of past dominant ideologies such as anti-
communism and how those have informed and driven strategic political decision-making 
about FDI and country choice, especially in the case of US MNCs. (MacLean et al., in this 
issue). Such an approach signals an emergent discursive trajectory for future studies of 
MNCs.  Third, and this is where we argue that our Special Issue ventures into novel and 
potentially contested areas of debate in IB, research shows how and why the fragmentation of 
the focal organization of the MNC through outsourcing and relocation decisions leads to the 
increasing politicization of management and labour processes in and around internationally 
operating firms (Pedraza-Acosta and Mouritsen; Mezihorak; Banerjee, in this issue). 
Conceptually two of the last three papers in this Special Issue draw directly on Clegg’s work 
on circuits of power, an approach that has only been randomly applied for in the study of 
political contestation and politicization in the context of international business and MNCs. 
We will elaborate on this matter and propose how the circuits of power framework can be 
applied and inform future studies on the politicization of MNCs, both from the outside and 
within, in the following section.  
 
Circuits of power in and around multinationals: financialization of international businesses 
organization as trigger and outcome 
In this section we will briefly introduce foundations and core ideas of the circuits of 
power framework, followed by a discussion on how its application might help make sense of 
current financialization of international business organizations, based on neo-liberal anti-
statist ideologies, which both trigger and are the outcome of politicization and battles within 
transnational social spaces. At issue, as we shall elaborate, is the flow of capital to the coffers 
of the state through taxation or into the profits of the MNC companies who generate the 
capital. A secondary issue is the extent to which the state should accommodate the MNCs by 
lightly taxing them or accommodate citizens by more heavily taxing the MNCs, as well as the 
justifications for either course of action. But first, a little theory. 
Following Foucault (1975/1977), Callon (1986) and Latour (1997, 2005) developed 
an actor network concept of power that stressed power as a capacity (puissance) as well as an 
ability to do things (pouvoir). Foucault conceived of a capillary form of power tracing its 
effects flowing through dispersed social relations generating control of specific resources. 
Actor-Network Theory’s (ANT) distinctive ontology includes both human and non-human 
actors, “collectively referred to as actants (…), all (…) participants in a network of 
heterogeneous components” (Volkoff et al., 2007: 834). ‘Obligatory passage points’ (OPPs) 
(Callon, 1986) represent devices (rhetorical and material) channelling and framing the 
‘conduct of conduct’ (Dean, 2013) in specific situational contexts; actors seek to maintain, 
gain or deny strategic advantage by controlling or contesting the meaning and control of these 
OPPs. OPPs also fix the rules guiding actors’ actions and constrain available possibilities. 
When successful, OPPs lead to a (temporary and partial) stabilisation or fixity of such rules, 
though permanently challengeable as actors continuously deploy their strategies of and for 
power.  
 
Building on these concepts, Clegg’s (1989) framework of ‘circuits of power’ depicts 
three circuits through which power flows. First, the episodic circuit captures visible exercises 
of power by actors in particular, day-to-day encounters, seeking to obtain outcomes favouring 
their definition of interests. These exercises depend on the configuration of the network of 
relations stabilised through the other two circuits. The circuit of social integration captures 
prevailing rules of practice shaping actors’ dispositions to behave in certain ways and 
includes rules of meaning and membership: rules of meaning guide actors in making sense of 
the world, events, others and themselves, hence shaping the actors’ knowledge which, in turn, 
underlies their (re)actions; rules of membership frame considerations about actors’ 
appropriate behaviour, in the context of identity assumptions and claims, given their (actual 
or desired) status as members of certain groups. Finally, the circuit of system integration 
consists of ‘material conditions’, based on techniques of production and discipline, such as 
production machinery, information systems, organisational structures and business processes 
– hence conveying power as facilitative, productive, positive. Together, rules of meaning and 
membership and techniques of production and discipline that become OPPs frame the 
institutional field in which actors episodically exercise power in specific interactions.  
‘Follow the money’ is an injunction well worth respecting in research into MNCs: 
after all, MNCs exist to make capital efficiently and effectively. The accumulation of capital 
is the key OPP for most MNCs. Clegg (1989) suggests that the stabilization of institutional 
fields as well as those arenas that emerge for battle within them depends, above all, on how 
these key OPPs are configured. The specific OPPs stabilizing global flow of profits are a 
central arena of power relations both within and around contemporary MNCs and in policy 
circles that seek to secure for states an effective flow of taxation. The arena is one fought 
over both ideologically and materially. Ideologically, the key requirement is to lessen the 
amount of MNC profit that disappears in tax whilst maintaining the legitimacy of whatever 
 
arrangements are instituted. Materially, it is to ensure that the global flows of capital are 
retained as far as possible within the accounting frame of the global MNC.  
Ideologically, MNCs, particularly the global accounting firms, were keen sponsors of 
new public management practices for government, as a way of minimizing the demands of 
the state on inputs raised through taxation, in a form of anti-statism (Christensen 2005). The 
creation of a consensus around a neo-liberally economic conception of the state was a battle 
fought nationally, through political parties and their representations. At issue was fixing an 
OPP that favoured a less regulatory state and a more unregulated corporate sector, especially 
in terms of taxation. Reducing the state’s need for taxation became a key OPP, achieved 
through new public management. The adoption of new public management started in the 
early 1980s with reforms informed by neo-classical economic theories relating to 
marketization and the more focussed adoption of private sector management techniques. 
These reforms were based on what has been termed an economic rationalism, including 
principles and practices derived from the private sector, replete with its focus on the 
perceived efficiency and effectiveness of this sector. Economic rationalism is defined by 
Pusey (1991: 14) as “a doctrine that says that markets and prices are the only reliable means 
of setting a value on anything, and further, that markets and money can always, at least in 
principle, deliver better outcomes than states and bureaucracies” (italics in original).  
Classical micro-economic theories such as agency theory, rational choice theory, public 
choice theory, transaction cost theory and principal agent theory had a strong ‘normative 
influence’ on the economic rationalism of public sector reforms (Box et al., 2001: 611; Nigro 
and Kellough, 2008). Micro-economic theory anchored in a ‘market-based model’ advocating 
downsizing of government, applying private sector management principles to public sector 
administration, viewing citizens as customers, divorcing policy making from administration 
implementation and viewing government as akin to a ‘business within the public sector’ (Box 
 
et al., 2001: 611; Kettl, 1997). Influenced by right wing ‘think tanks’ and two popular texts 
Reinventing Government (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992) and Banishing Bureaucracy (Osborne 
and Plastrik, 1997) the reinvention movement of public sector reform (Brudney, Herbert and 
Wright, 1999; Brudney and Wright, 2002; Calista, 2002) flourished. Nowhere was it stronger 
than in the United States, where the ideological OPPs of anti-statism were well established 
after the Reagan administration of the 1980s. 
In the United States, home of the majority of the world’s MNCs, favourable economic 
policies were promoted for the rich, such as low taxation, minimal control of offshore 
accounts as tax havens, ease of inter-generational wealth transmission through inheritance 
laws, free mobility of capital and anti-union laws, all implemented as a part of a neo-liberal 
agenda, one widely adopted in the English-speaking world (Freeland 2013) and justified in 
terms of a pro-business rhetoric that lower taxation would increase investments, and 
increased investments would create more jobs and higher wages. After the Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC) signs of which first emerged in 2007, coming to a head in 2008, right-wing 
governments elected in the aftermath of the GFC translated the agenda of trickledown 
economics into the promise of austerity, especially in the UK, after 2010 and in Australia, 
after 2013. 
Austerity became an integral part of the war on the state that was associated with neo-
liberal economics. Diagnostically, the predominant view held by politicians influenced by 
neo-liberal economics was that the state, and the public expenditure that supported it, had 
become too large. The desire was for a smaller state to be achieved by cutting public 
expenditures (Jackson and Lapsley, 2003). As the largest fraction of these expenditures went 
to support elements of the ‘social wage’, such as unemployment benefits, welfare and related 
expenses, these policies led to an increased rhetoric opposed to government spending in these 
areas, as well as a policy focus targeted to levels of public sector debt reduction. Rather than 
 
growing the size of the surplus through government investments that would lift economic 
activity and thus increase tax receipts, as would have been the prescription of Keynes, the 
focus was very largely on the expenditure side of the equation (Streeck, 2014).  
Specific targets for expenditure control were increased as a result of the Global 
Financial Crisis because governments had responded to the massive losses in financial capital 
values during this period by, effectively nationalizing the debts incurred by the bankers. 
Then, to pay off these debts, central governments such as those in the UK since 2010, 
practised austerity in areas targeted as fields of public sector expenditure, including public 
sector salaries, pensions, as well as general welfare and social provision, including education, 
health and social services. At the same time that governments practised austerity for the 
masses they praised tax cuts for the elites on the grounds that lower personal and especially 
corporate taxes would encourage economic activity and the benefits would be distributed in 
the form of enhanced employment opportunities and a trickledown effect of increased wages 
paid by more successful business. It didn’t work out that way, say Ruiz, Peralta-Avia and Puy 
(2017) in an important International Monetary Fund paper. Looking at longitudinal data from 
the United States they argue that while lowering tax rates for the rich stimulates the economy, 
it does so at the great cost of increased inequality. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
study modelled the impacts of tax cuts on a US-style economy and found income-tax cuts 
reduced tax revenue across the board. While growth was stimulated the increased 
employment and wages did not offset revenue lost from lower marginal tax rates. More 
growth occurs when cuts are made to the highest level of taxes but high-income tax cuts “lead 
to increased spending on goods and services, which in turn could improve wages for those 
lower-income earners who provided those goods, but it would also cause prices to rise and 
would need to be paid for by either other tax increases or cuts to government spending” 
(Jericho, 2017). Economic growth occurs but at the cost of increased inequality as lower and 
 
middle class consumption adjusted to rising prices by consuming less or borrowing more. If 
the tax cuts are targeted at middle and lower class incomes there is less overall growth but 
reduced income inequality, as people from lower income households are able to spend more 
on life’s necessities. Linked to these findings is another IMF paper, from the journal Finance 
and Development, by Ostry, Loungani and Furceri (2016: 40) that argues that “austerity 
policies not only generate substantial welfare costs due to supply-side channels, they also hurt 
demand – and thus worsen employment and unemployment”.  
Episodically, if less of MNC profit share goes to the state in the form of taxation 
then more remains at the discretion of the MNC. How have MNCs exercised this 
discretion? We need to understand that MNCs are complex networks with centralized 
governance at the headquarters coordinating activities through subsidiary units. What is 
crucial for them is how the overall system of the network, especially in its relations with 
state taxation authorities, is integrated. The objective is to minimize tax and maximize 
profits. The price mechanism is used to control subunit performance because the 
subsidiaries have to meet agreed performance targets or be sanctioned, with the ultimate 
sanction being their demise; inter-unit transactions are coordinated by transfer pricing 
mechanisms, where value is determined by in-house accountancy rules and decisions. 
MNCs are quite sophisticated in moving tax losses around their global operations and 
using the pricing of internally traded goods to minimize liabilities where they will attract 
the highest regimes of tax – something referred to as transfer pricing.  
Transfer pricing works thus: first, a holding company is established in a tax haven, 
where little or no corporate tax is charged. Second, complex intercompany contracts are 
written that transfer valuable, rare, intangible and non-substitutable assets such as 
software, trademarks and branding to the non-taxed or lightly taxed holding company. 
Costs are then assigned to these intangible assets. In theory, these costs are supposed to be 
 
valued at market prices, as if the company were selling its service to a separate company. 
The costs are not in any sense of the word ‘real’ costs; they are whatever clever 
accounting can inflate them to be, not particularly difficult where one is dealing with 
hugely oligopolistic companies that can straddle the globe as virtual monopolies, such as 
Amazon, News Corp International and Google. Unrealistically low values can be assigned 
to the initial transfer of the intangible assets from the parent company to the holding 
company established in the favourable tax environment (see Jones and Teamouri, 2016; 
Sika and Willmott, 2010; Palan,Murphy and Chavagneux, 2010).  
Once these intangible assets have been assigned at a low exit value to the holding 
company in havens such as Luxembourg, Ireland, Bermuda or Singapore, they become 
intellectual property that can then be licensed and leased back to global subsidiaries 
established in different national tax authorities such as the US, UK or Australia. In return 
for using the intellectual property, substantial tax-deductible royalty fees are paid by the 
subsidiaries. These are tax-deductible. The company in question fixes the transfer prices, 
often in a context where there is little effective market testing, precisely because it can be 
claimed that the assets are valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable. In this way 
taxable income that is accountable in any given national authorities’ jurisdiction is 
minimized. Substantial profits accrue in accounting regimes where little or no tax is 
charged. The holding companies then make payments as a fee for the holding rights to the 
license back to the country of origin of the business, such as the US, which transaction is 
charged at a value that seems quite low by comparison to the transactions costs charged in 
the tax havens. MNC and personal tax avoidance on a massive scale, through the creation 
of complex global tax accounting vehicles, whose major purpose is to reduce tax liability 
through transfer pricing, has been exposed in the Panama Papers and the Paradise Papers, 
 
publicized by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists through the web 
sites of The Guardian newspaper in English3 and Süddeutsche Zeitung in German.4 
Episodically, MNCs are legally able to minimize tax by these practices. Advised as they 
are by accounting, law and tax advice firms on how to move capital amongst various 
jurisdictions to minimize tax they can stay within the letter of existing laws that are 
framed within a national juridical space; they are able to do this because their networks 
and the circuits of power these enable are not nationally bounded but relationally 
networked transnationally. Social integration ideologically in national circuits of 
governmental power and material system integration transnationally in terms of flows of 
capital work together in MNCs’ favour.  
 
Contributions and emergent themes  
In this section we return to the individual contributions of this Special Issue and the 
question of how the papers have advanced research on the politicization and political contests 
in contemporary MNCs. See Table 1 below for an overview, which also lists issues and 
questions that have been identified by the authors for further research.  
We finally refer to a few emergent themes that might be of interest for students of the 
politicization and political contests within and around contemporary MNCs by providing 
useful foundations and springboards for future research. 
The first paper by Levy and Reiche, a conceptual study, examines the role of culture in 
constructing social hierarchies and symbolic boundaries between individuals and groups in 
MNCs. These authors, drawing upon the Bourdieusian concept of cultural capital, consider 
the reproduction of power relations and symbolic boundaries between employee groups in 
MNCs under contrasting hierarchical and network-based architectures. 
 
The second article by Maclean et al, engages in historically informed research into the 
role of political ideology in the discursive construction of a leading player in the hotel 
industry, acknowledge the significance of political ideology as a particular ‘social skill’ in 
engaging in international business across variegated national contexts. The study casts 
valuable light on the processes of early post- war globalization. 
In the third paper in this Special Issue Pedraza-Acosta and Mouritsen consider how 
the dominant rationality of financialization is operationalized and deployed in political intra- 
and inter- organizational processes with reference to a French industrial MNC. Drawing upon 
the notion of circuits of power, it is contended that devices such as accounting calculations, in 
furtherance of an agenda of financialization, may be initiated the expense of viable industrial 
partnership arrangements with suppliers and the like. The ideological power associated with 
financial economics accordingly results in cost reductions that render global production 
networks fragile. 
In the fourth article by Mezihorak, another empirical study, the effects of the 
relocation of the activities of a MNC to a Shared Service Centre on the labour process are 
discussed. The impact on workplace actors of political contests and circuits of power both 
inside and outside the MNC are captured. Patterns of competition and cooperation instigated 
by client departments and headquarters in the organization in question resulted in increased 
managerial control and fragmentation of labour processes, as well as shifts in the form of 
corporate governance. 
The fifth and final paper of the Special Issue by Banerjee advances traditional 
political CSR research by focusing on the socio-economic tensions created by MNCs in 
industries such as extraction in developing economy settings. Focusing on conflicts between 
communities, the state and MNCs arising from the negative social and environmental impacts 
of mining and extraction, this grounded analysis concludes that governance mechanisms in 
 
such industries should more fully incorporate the legitimate interests of communities 
disadvantaged by MNC operations. The author provides a new research framework denoting 
such research on ‘translocal governance’.  
Together, the contributions to this Special Issue have served to address how contests 
and struggles within MNCs connect with wider societal developments such as the 
transnational spread of dominant ideologies relating to the ongoing financialization process. 
In recent times standardization and centralization of core business activities within so-called 
‘global factories’ (Buckley, 2011) has been observed, as well as the externalization of 
formerly core business activities through outsourcing and relocation. Such global 
developments are prone to trigger political contests within the MNCs production networks 
between subsidiaries or shared service centres and local campaigners or trade unions 
(Dörrenbaecher et al., 2017).  
In terms of emergent themes, we have first, gained useful insights through the 
application of the circuits of power framework which sheds light on internal and external 
political contests (constituting episode aspects of power) and how these are interlinked with 
systematic power relations within the MNC and across the wider society. The latter aspects 
are both stabilized and destabilized through the use of new digital technologies and 
accounting methods (including tax-avoidance and minimization schemes) that support the 
flow of capital in one direction towards affluent investors and senior managers but away from 
substantive investments in labour and communities.  As pointed out in the previous section, 
the narrow framing and stabilization of OPPs of financially driven circuits of power within 
and around MNCs has led to the emergence of more fragmented, unstable and frequently 
disruptive power relations on the part of MNCs with their suppliers (see Pedraza-Acosta and 
Mouritsen, in this issue). 
 
Second, an important issue pointed to by some of our contributions is that the role of 
nation states has not lost its significance as, for example, political CSR approaches may have 
led us to believe. Nation states, however weak they may be, are still important rule-setters 
and possess sanctioning power in cases where MNCs abuse or misuse power (see Banerjee, 
in this issue). National institutions can still be the provider of local power resources for 
community building, but also in supporting struggling local businesses. Related to the latter 
we have seen that the state in coordinated marked economies such as France still plays an 
important role, if only by intervening after increased politicization of the MNC and its 
production network triggers organizational failure and bankruptcy (see Pedraza-Acosta and 
Mouritsen, in this issue).  
Third, we have witnessed the important role that dominant ideologies play in 
establishing and controlling certain OPPs within circuits of power in and around MNCs. Our 
contributions refer directly and indirectly to the matter of why and how neo-liberal ideologies 
provide discursive resources which have been used to legitimize certain strategic approaches 
of financial management, accounting, foreign investment, de-investments, outsourcing etc. 
(see MacLean et al.; Mezihorak; Pedraza-Acosta and Mouritsen, in this issue).  
Besides the focus of analysis on the crucial role of management within the MNC’s 
politicization processes, our contributions have additionally emphasised, fourth, that it is vital 
to take labour issues into account in this field of study, especially concerning how local 
labour relations supports negotiated outcomes in political contests concerning relocation and 
reintegration of management and labour in MNCs. The latter events often trigger 
politicization within the transnational social spaces of MNCs (see Mezihorak; Pedraza-
Acosta and Mouritsen; Banerjee, in this issue).  
Fifth and finally, we can apprehend that power relations in MNCs are, in large parts, 
still hierarchically structured, thus headquarters power over subsidiaries is invariably 
 
asymmetrical in relation to its subsidiaries. As previously stressed, the headquarters as a 
“legal, financial and accounting entity” has “power over transfer pricing, tax liabilities and 
the identification of profits” in a transnational social space that is both hierarchically and 
network structured (Morgan, 2011:433). There is increasing evidence that hierarchical and 
asymmetric forms of organizing do not disappear in the network-forms of the MNC. New, 
and often informal, rules of the game maintain hierarchical power relations, based on both 
innovative and traditional forms of social and cultural capital, as Levy and Reiche show in 
this issue. Questions for further research include how new, and often informal, power 
hierarchies and asymmetrical headquarters‒subsidiary relations become politically 
characteristic both within internal MNC-networks and externally, involving local 
governmental actors, suppliers, Shared Service Centres, and so on. Similar question are raised 
in the papers of Mezihorak, Pedraza-Acosta and Mouritsen and Banerjee in this issue.  
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Notes 
1 See also Royle (2000) for critical analysis of labour practices at McDonald’s, pointing to the 
‘dark side’ of the globalization success story of US low cost leadership. 
2 There have, of course, always been occasional efforts by some IB scholars, see e.g. Hymer 
(1970), Boddewyn (1988), Birkinshaw (1996), Mudambi and Navarra (2004) for prominent 
examples to address ‘political aspects’ of MNCs. The impact of these efforts on mainstream 
theory building and research however has been rather limited, especially when it comes to 
both the in-depth analysis of the political role of the MNCs in contemporary capitalism (see 
 
e.g. Scherer and Palazzo, 2011) and micro-political dynamics within MNCs (Geppert and 
Dörrenbächer, 2014). 
3 See https://www.theguardian.com/news/series/panama-papers. 
4 See http://panamapapers.sueddeutsche.de/en/ 
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